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[1]  Because of a conviction that e-discovery presents unique issues 
requiring uniform national rules, the Judicial Conference of the United 
States (“Judicial Conference”) has recommended and the Supreme Court 
has approved a number of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (“Proposed Rules”), which are scheduled to go into effect at the 
end of 2006.2  The Proposed Rules include provisions to address issues 
relating to the production of electronically stored information3 and, for the 
                                                 
1 © 2006 Thomas Y. Allman.  Mr. Allman is Senior Counsel to Mayer, Brown, Rowe & 
Maw, LLP and served as Senior Vice-President and General Counsel of BASF 
Corporation from 1993 until 2004.  He is a member of the Sedona Conference WG1 
Steering Committee on Electronic Information Management and co-chair of the Lawyers 
for Civil Justice Committee on Electronic Discovery.  He was an early advocate of e-
discovery amendments.  See Thomas Y. Allman, The Need for Federal Standards 
Regarding Electronic Discovery, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 206, 209 (2001). 
2 The Proposed Rules and Committee Notes can be found on the website of the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts.  U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL 
RULEMAKING, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/newrules6.html#cv0804 (last visited May 
14, 2006).; see JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2005), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf [hereinafter STANDING 
COMMITTEE REPORT] (containing the final version of the Rules and the Committee Notes 
and the introductory explanations to the Judicial Conference not found on the 
Administrative Office site noted above).  
3  U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL RULEMAKING, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/newrules6.html#cv0804 (last visited May 14, 2006).  
“[E]lectronically stored information” is the term adopted by the Proposed Rules to 
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first time, add limitations on rule-based sanctions regarding failure to 
produce that type of information.  They also establish a new paradigm of 
mandatory early discussion of contentious issues, including preservation 
of potentially discoverable information. 
 
[2]  This article examines the Proposed Rules and their likely impact.  Its 
premise is that the Proposed Rules represent a remarkable and balanced 
achievement which will have a positive influence.  The article concludes 
with some modest suggestions for my former colleagues who will deal 
with the Proposed Rules from within corporate entities. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
[3]  The Proposed Rules were developed by the Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee of the Standing Committee of the Judicial Conference 
(“Advisory Committee”). 4  The original package of rules and committee 
notes was released for public comment in August 2004.5  It resulted from 
substantial interaction with the bench and bar over a period of several 
years,6 and evolved out of a set of recommendations by a subcommittee of 
the Advisory Committee.7  Those recommendations were the focus of 
                                                                                                                         
uniquely capture that information in electronic form which is subject to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”).  The term is generally used throughout the 
discovery rules included in the package.  See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 
2, at Rules 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, 45, & Form 35. 
4 The official title of the Standing Committee is “The Committee on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States” and it includes advisory 
committees on appellate, bankruptcy, civil, criminal and evidence rules.  James C. Duff,  
The Rulemaking Process: A Summary for the Bench and Bar (Oct. 2004), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm. 
5 See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE (2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2005/CVAug04.pdf 
[hereinafter ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, AUGUST 2004]. 
6 Mini-conferences on e-discovery issues had been held at Hastings Law School and 
Brooklyn Law School in 2000.  ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, AUGUST 2004, supra 
note 5, at 5.  “Since then, bar organizations, attorneys, computer specialists, and members 
of the public have devoted much time and energy in helping the rules committees 
understand and address the serious problems arising from discovery of electronically 
stored information.”  STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 22. 
7 Richard J. Marcus, Consultant to the Discovery Subcommittee, issued a comprehensive 
(63 page) report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules in September 2003 on behalf 
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extensive discussions at a conference on e-discovery held at Fordham Law 
School prior to their finalization for public comment.8  The discussion 
occurred against a backdrop of evolving case law in the federal courts, the 
adoption of state9 and local district court rules,10 and the issuance of “best 
practice” guidelines by the Sedona Conference11 and the ABA Section on 
Litigation.12  In part, the decision to proceed with the rule-making process 
                                                                                                                         
of the Discovery Subcommittee which presaged most of the eventual amendments, albeit 
in preliminary form for discussion only.  See E-Discovery Rule Discussion Proposals 
(Sept 15, 2003), http://www.kenwithers.com/rulemaking/civilrules/marcus091503a.pdf. 
8 The Conference was held at Fordham University Law School in February 2004.  
Participants in the Conference came from a wide cross-section of participants in the e-
discovery process.  See ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEMORANDUM (Jan. 27, 2004), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/E-Discovery_Conf_Agenda_Materials.pdf. 
9 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4 (2006) (requiring production of all responsive electronic data 
which is “reasonably available to the responding party in its ordinary course of business” 
and allowing an objection if it cannot be retrieved by “reasonable efforts.”); MISS. R. CIV. 
P. 26(b)(5) (2006) (imposing the same requirements as Texas).  Texas and Mississippi 
differ on whether mandatory cost-shifting is appropriate.  Compare TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4 
(2006) with MISS R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5) (2006).  Cf. CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 2017(e)(2) 
(repealed 2005) (limiting orders to produce in electronic media which create an undue 
economic burden or hardship). 
10 A common thread in all district court rules was an emphasis on informed early 
discussion and participation in preparation for Rule 26(f) and Rule 16(b) scheduling 
orders.  See, e.g., E.D. & W.D. ARK. LOC. R. 26.1; D. DEL. R. 16.4(b); D.N.J. LOC. CIV. 
R. 26.1; D. WYO. LOC. R. 26.1 & Appendix D; United States District Court, District of 
Kansas, Electronic Discovery Guidelines, 
http://www.ksd.uscourts.gov/guidelines/electronicdiscoveryguidelines.pdf. 
11 The Sedona Principles, a set of fourteen “best practice” recommendations intended for 
the courts and parties, were developed by an ad hoc group of experienced representatives 
of producing parties, in-house counsel, technology companies, and service providers after 
an initial meeting in October 2002.  See generally The Sedona Conference, The Sedona 
Principles: Best Practices Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic 
Document Production (2005), http://www.thesedonaconference.org [hereinafter The 
Sedona Principles].  For a comparison of The Sedona Principles and the initial rule 
proposals, see Thomas Y. Allman, Proposed National E-Discovery Standards and the 
Sedona Principles, 72 DEF. COUNS. J. 47 (2005) (arguing that they are basically 
consistent). 
12 See American Bar Association, Electronic Discovery Task Force, Report 103B, 
Amendments to the Civil Discovery Standards (2004), 
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/taskforces/electronic/ (follow “Final Revised Standards” 
hyperlink). 
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was motivated by a concern for the possible consequences of inaction at 
the national level.13 
 
[4]  The final form of the Proposed Rules differs from the original 
proposals in several major respects and came into being only after 
extensive public hearings held in San Francisco, Dallas and Washington, 
D.C. in January and February 2005 (“Public Hearings”).14  They were 
revised at an April 2005 meeting of the Advisory Committee15 and 
subsequently reported to16 and approved by the Standing Committee.17  
The Judicial Conference gave its approval to the full package in 
September 2005 and the Supreme Court added its endorsement in April 
2006.18  Assuming—as is expected—that Congress takes no action to 
prevent their enactment, the Proposed Rules will go into effect on 
December 1, 2006. 
PRODUCTION FROM ACCESSIBLE SOURCES 
 
[5]  The first major innovation in the Proposed Rules relates to the scope 
of the obligation of a producing party to search for and produce relevant 
and non-privileged electronically stored information as part of an initial 
                                                 
13 The Standing Committee is concerned that “[w]ithout national rules adequate to 
address the issues raised by electronic discovery, a patchwork of rules and requirements 
is likely to develop,” resulting in “uncertainty, expense, delays, and burdens” being 
imposed on both small organizations and individual litigants as well as large public and 
private organizations.  STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at 23. 
14 The Public Hearings were held by the Advisory Committee on January 12 in San 
Francisco, January 28 in Dallas and February 11 in Washington, D.C.  Comments were 
accepted through February 15, 2005. United States Courts, Civil Rules Comments Chart 
(2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery.html (providing copies of the 
comments and transcripts of the remarks of testifying witnesses). 
15 See generally Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Minutes (April 14–15, 2005), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CRAC0405.pdf [hereinafter Advisory Committee 
Minutes, April 2005]. 
16 See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, Advisory Committee Report to Standing Committee (May 27, 2005), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV5-2005.pdf. 
17 See generally Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Minutes (June 15–16, 
2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/ST_June_2005.pdf. 
18 The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2000).  The statute authorizes the 
Supreme Court and “all courts established by Act of Congress” to “prescribe rules for the 
conduct of their business.”  Id. § 2071. 
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disclosure19 or in response to a request for production.20  Under amended 
Rule 26(b)(2)(B), absent a court order, a party need only search and 
produce from “reasonably accessible” sources of electronically stored 
information, provided that it also identifies those sources which it regards 
as “not reasonably accessible” to opposing counsel.21  Whether a 
particular source is, in fact, “not reasonably accessible” turns on whether 
the act of acquiring the information from it involves “undue burden or 
cost.”22  The Rule provides for challenges by requesting parties for 
production from inaccessible sources, to be ordered upon a showing of 
“good cause.”23 
 
[6]  This is an innovative and practical resolution to the concerns 
identified in the Public Hearings about e-discovery.24  Despite criticism 
that it was not needed,25 the Advisory Committee adopted the Rule to help 
                                                 
19 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-30. 
20 Id. at C-70. 
21 Id. at C-45 to C-46.  
22 Id. 
23 Id. at C-45 to C-46. 
On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from 
whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not 
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.  If that showing 
is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from such sources 
if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations of 
Rule 26(b)(2)(C).  The court may specify conditions for the discovery. 
Id. 
24 At the Public Hearings, witnesses confirmed that a process of focusing on readily 
accessible electronic information effectively resolves most disputes and that a similar 
process is already firmly established in the hard copy world (albeit without the 
affirmative identification requirement).  
25 The proposed amendment was criticized by some as unnecessary, given the discretion 
under existing rules regarding the limitation of discovery.  See Ronald J. Hedges, A View 
from the Bench and the Trenches: A Critical Appraisal of Some Proposed Amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 227 F.R.D. 123, 128 (2005) (stating that 
bifurcation of discovery is unnecessary because the dispute is all “about the difficulty and 
costs of retrieving data, accessible or not”); accord Henry S. Noyes, “Is E-Discovery So 
Different That It Requires New Discovery Rules? An Analysis of Proposed Amendments 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” 71 TENN. L. REV. 585, 615 (2004) (arguing that 
there is “no clear demand for reform” because most of the recorded complaints arise from 
the “defense bar’s need to further limit the scope and amount of discovery”).   
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curb excessive expense and streamline discovery in a majority of cases.26  
The Rule continues the tradition of the 1983 reforms, which were designed 
to achieve a similar purpose by introducing “proportionality, balance and 
common sense” into Rule 26(b).27 
 
[7]  As noted, the Rule provides a process for challenging the designation 
of a source as “not reasonably accessible” and a method for trumping 
inaccessibility, even if established, by proof of “good cause.”28  A 
producing party defending a decision not to produce by reason of 
inaccessibility has the burden of proof, and the issue can be raised by 
either party.  The Committee Note suggests that targeted discovery, 
including the use of sampling,29 may be necessary in some cases to resolve 
disputes if the parties are unable to agree.30  The court can order 
                                                 
26 See generally The Sedona Principles, supra note 11.  Sedona Principle number eight 
states: 
The primary source of electronic data and documents for productions 
should be active data and information purposefully stored in a manner 
that anticipates future business use and permits efficient searching and 
retrieval.  Resort to disaster recovery backup tapes and other sources of 
data and documents require the requesting party to demonstrate need 
and relevance that outweigh the cost, burden and disruption of 
retrieving and processing the data from such sources. 
Id. 
27 Letter from Arthur Miller, Professor, Harvard Law School, to Peter G. McCabe, 
Secretary, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (February 10, 2005), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery/04-CV-219.pdf; see also 8 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2008.1 (2d ed. 1994).  The 
Advisory Committee anticipates that a requesting party will evaluate the information 
from accessible sources before insisting that the responding party search for, retrieve and 
produce whatever responsive information may be found in inaccessible sources.  See 
STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-48 (“[I]n many cases the responding 
party will be able to produce information from reasonably accessible sources that will 
fully satisfy the parties’ discovery needs”). 
28 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-46. 
29 See McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001) (ordering “test run” of 
backup tape restoration to determine whether the sample justifies further search). 
30 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-48 (stating that “[s]uch discovery 
might take the form of requiring the responding party to conduct a sampling of 
information contained on the sources identified as not reasonably accessible; allowing 
some form of inspection of such sources; or taking depositions of witnesses 
knowledgeable about the responding party’s information systems”).  The issue of 
accessibility and good cause for production are normally so intertwined that a single 
hearing may suffice to resolve both types of challenges.  Id. at C-49. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XII, Issue 4 
 
7 
production of discoverable information from inaccessible sources, 
provided that the burdens and costs are justified by the circumstances of 
the case.31  The court retains the discretion to shift some of the retrieval 
costs but is not required to do so, in contrast to the mandatory practice 
urged by some for inclusion in the Rule.32 
 
[8]  The approach in proposed Rule 26(b)(2)(B) is intended to be 
technologically neutral.  Existing case law under Rule 26(c)33 involving 
cost shifting in electronic discovery may provide some useful guidance on 
whether ordering access to a particular source involves “undue burden or 
cost.”34  Magnetic backup tapes used for disaster recovery purposes,35 
legacy data stored on obsolete and unused media, and information on 
databases not programmed to produce the information sought are typical 
examples of inaccessible sources in today’s applications.36  The test is not 
whether the source of information is routinely accessed in the ordinary 
course of business; the reference to “undue burden or cost” was added in 
                                                 
31 Id. at C-46, C-47.  The proposed Committee Note to Rule 26(b)(2) also articulates a 
fairly precise series of factors intended to help guide the process of identifying when 
“good cause” may exist.  Id. at C-49. 
32 The Advisory Committee was not prepared to re-open old wounds and mandate cost-
shifting as a deterrent to overbroad discovery requests.  Contra TEX. R. CIV. P. 196.4 
(requiring payment of the reasonable costs of any “extraordinary steps required” to 
produce electronic information).  The proposed Committee Note to Rule 26(b)(2) 
suggests that a court may condition production from inaccessible sources on payment of 
“the reasonable costs of obtaining information” and that the “burdens in reviewing the 
information for relevance and privilege” can be used as a basis for denial of discovery.  
STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-50. 
33 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (providing that a court may limit discovery which involves 
“undue burden or expense”).   
34 Differentiation based on accessibility of electronically stored information was used in 
an early Zubulake decision to allocate the costs of access to various types of storage 
media.  See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 217 F.R.D. 309, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) [hereinafter 
Zubulake I].  Inherent in such an assessment is the concept of avoiding undue burdens.  
For example, in Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, No. 01-2373-M1V, 2003 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8587 (W.D. Tenn. May 13, 2003), the court found that it would be an 
“undue” burden to require the restoration of the 996 network backup tapes at issue and 
ordered cost-sharing formula subject to a protocol.  Id. at *9. 
35 Medtronic Somafor Danek, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8587, at *25–26 (discussing the 
burdens involved in converting from backup tape format to a format that a computer can 
read followed by elimination of duplicates and conversion to a standard format so that a 
search program may seek information from the restored tapes). 
36 See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-42. 
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part to emphasize that differentiation is intended to be made solely on that 
basis.37 
 
A NOTE ON IDENTIFICATION 
 
[9]  Under Rule 26(b)(2)(B), the producing party must “identify” to the 
requesting party a description of any inaccessible sources of potentially 
responsive information that it does not intend to search or utilize for 
production.38  The affirmative requirement that a party disclose what it has 
not undertaken to search is new to American discovery practice,39 
although firmly embedded in English Practice Directions regarding 
electronic disclosure,40 and its impact remains to be seen.  The 
                                                 
37 An initial reference in the Committee Note suggested that a party may not rely upon 
the rule if a party actually accesses the requested information, even if the costs of doing 
so were substantial.  ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, AUGUST 2004, supra note 5, at 12.  
The final Committee Note effectively overrules this comment through its emphasis on 
burdens and costs of access regardless of use.  See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra 
note 2, at C-45 to C-46; see also Sarah A. L. Phillips, Comment, Discoverability of 
Electronic Data Under the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure: How Effective Are Proposed Protections for “Not Reasonably Accessible” 
Data?, 83 N.C.L. REV. 984, 1005 (2005) (arguing the rationale for protecting data not 
accessed in the ordinary course of business disappears when changing technology makes 
it possible to retrieve information inexpensively). 
38 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (Proposed Official Draft 2006) (requiring parties 
to identify sources of information that were not searched when using electronic discovery 
methods) with FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (allowing a party to concentrate on files from 
which one can anticipate finding discoverable documents when using hard copy 
discovery methods.) 
39 Typically, courts only asserted that power in response to a specific controversy and as 
part of a motion to compel.   See Zhou v. Pittsburg State University, No. 01-2493-KHV, 
2003 WL 1905988, *3 (D. Kan. Feb. 5, 2003) (ordering a producing party to describe 
efforts made to search for information).  
40 Since October 2005, parties in English High Court cases have operated under a 
Practice Direction which requires parties to identify efforts to search, or not search, 
categories of electronic documents by type and location.  The requirement stems from the 
general “disclosure” practice regarding information subject to disclosure under CPR Rule 
31.7(3).  See Department for Constitutional Affairs, Practice Direction – Disclosure and 
Inspection, 
http:www.dca.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fin/contents/practice_directions/pd_part31.htm#ID
AUWVRD (last visited April 18, 2006).  A suggested disclosure statement form can be 
found in the Annex to the Practice Direction.  The form gives specific examples of the 
categories and types of disclosures that are contemplated but publicly available 
experience under the Program Direction is not yet available. 
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identification “should, to the extent possible, provide enough detail to 
enable the requesting party to evaluate the burdens and costs of providing 
the discovery and the likelihood of finding responsive information on the 
identified sources.”41  A party can satisfy the requirement by listing a 
generic “category or type.”42  The adequacy of generic disclosures may be 
questioned and discovery required if the parties cannot agree upon 
whether the sources should be searched. 
 
[10]  In the end, the identification requirement may well prove to be the 
single most creative and far-reaching change in the Proposed Rules.43  As 
a minimum, it will place a premium on developing a pro-active and 
aggressive appreciation of the myriad alternative sources of potentially 
responsive information that may attend an individual case. 
PRESERVATION AND THE AMENDMENTS 
 
[11]  Advocates for e-discovery rule changes, such as the author, typically 
sought greater certainty in the definition of the requirements for 
preservation of electronically stored information before discovery 
commenced.44  However, the Amendments in their final form neither 
articulate such preservation requirements with precision nor set forth a 
standard of care to help in making preservation decisions.45  While the 
Advisory Committee initially considered drafting explicit rules to describe 
preservation obligations, including the “trigger” or onset of such 
                                                 
41 See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-48. 
42 Id. at C-47. 
43 See Richard Acello, E-mail to Lawyers: E-Discovery Rules on the Way, A.B.A. J., 
October 7, 2005, http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/oc7rules.html (quoting Greg 
Joseph, an authority on federal procedure, to the effect that the identification requirement 
is the only real change in Rule 26(b)(2)). 
44 See Allman, supra note 1, at 209 (suggesting a rule which would have provided that 
“[n]othing in these rules shall require the responding party to suspend or alter the 
operation in good faith of disaster recovery or other electronic or computer systems 
absent [a] court order issued upon good cause shown”).  
45 See Letter from Robert L. Byman, Chairman, American College of Trial Lawyers, to 
Peter G. McCabe, Secretary, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States (Jan. 25, 2005), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/e-discovery.html (recommending that the Advisory 
Committee include a standard of reasonableness for both preservation and production). 
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obligations, at least after litigation commenced,46 it ultimately elected not 
to tackle that thorny issue and instead focused on early discussion of 
preservation issues in hopes of forcing agreement or facilitating an early 
court ruling.47 
 
[12]  Thus, while the Committee Notes endorse an effective use of the 
“litigation hold” process48 and emphasize the need to carefully assess the 
implications of the routine operations of information systems,49 it is to the 
evolving case law to which counsel seeking to make tough preservation 
decisions must principally turn.  The basics are fairly clear.  The 
obligation to preserve discoverable evidence in electronic form pending 
discovery can arise before the filing of a complaint, since its focus is on 
maintaining information for use at trial.50  Common law preservation 
obligations typically arise as a necessary implication of the obligation not 
                                                 
46 The initial version of Rule 37(f), published before the Public Hearings, limited the 
scope of its sanction relief to post-litigation conduct because it was conditioned on 
meeting preservation obligations defined by the rule as in existence only after litigation 
commenced.  STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-86.  Proposed Rule 
37(f), which is intended to relieve some of the harshness of these rules, does not 
differentiate based on temporal considerations since its nexus is the impact on the ability 
to produce information in discovery.  Id. at C-87 (stating that “a party is not permitted to 
exploit the routine operation of an information system to thwart discovery obligations by 
allowing that operation to continue in order to destroy specific stored information that it 
is required to preserve”) (emphasis added).   
47 Id. at C-87. 
Whether good faith would call for steps to prevent the loss of 
information on sources that the party believes are not reasonably 
accessible under Rule 26(b)(2) depends on the circumstances of each 
case.  One factor is whether the party reasonably believes that the 
information on such sources is likely to be discoverable and not 
available from reasonably accessible sources. 
Id. 
48 Id. (describing actions taken pursuant to a “litigation hold” process as one aspect of 
assessing and executing preservation obligations). 
49 Id. at C-87 (stating that “[a] preservation obligation may arise from many sources, 
including common law, statutes, regulations, or a court order in the case”). 
50 See Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D. 
Cal. 1984) (imposing a threshold duty to preserve all documents and information that 
may be relevant in litigation once the obligation arises); Broccoli v. Echostar Commc’ns 
Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506, 516–17 (D. Md. 2005) (holding that a preservation duty was 
triggered by conversations with supervisor prior to filing of EEOC complaint). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XII, Issue 4 
 
11 
to spoliate evidence needed for trial.51  Some statutory or regulatory 
retention requirements can also create preservation obligations cognizable 
in litigation.52  Moreover, criminal penalties can be invoked against 
someone who destroys information in contemplation of a federal 
investigation or proceeding with the intent to obstruct that matter.53 
 
[13]  The onset of the preservation obligation, known as the “triggering” 
event, is usually marked by receipt of a pre-suit demand or the filing of a 
complaint but, in some cases, pre-litigation events are sufficiently 
predictive to invoke the obligation.  The ability to self-designate sources 
of potentially discoverable information as inaccessible under Rule 
26(b)(2)(B) does not change the responsibility to assess preservation 
imperatives.54  There is a general consensus that the discharge of 
preservation obligations involves “reasonable and good faith efforts” to 
identify electronic information that may be relevant, but it is manifestly 
“unreasonable to expect parties to take every conceivable step to preserve 
all potentially relevant” electronically stored information.55  A flexible and 
                                                 
51 See Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001). 
52 See Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2001).  Under 
some circumstances, regulations can create the requisite obligation to retain records even 
if the litigation involving the records is not reasonably foreseeable.  For such a duty to 
attach, however, the party seeking the inference must be a member of the general class of 
persons that the regulatory agency sought to protect in promulgating the rule.  Id.   
53 Congress expanded the obstruction of justice statute to include actions undertaken “in 
relation to or contemplation of” any federal investigation or case.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1519 
(West Supp. 2005).   See Dana E. Hill, Note, Anticipatory Obstruction of Justice: Pre-
emptive Document Destruction under the Sarbanes-Oxley Anti-Shredding Statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 1519, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 1519, 1565–69 (2004) (discussing the potential 
imposition of criminal liability for the destruction of information pursuant to a records 
retention policy). 
54 It was argued under the former proposal that the issue could be avoided by a producing 
party who improperly designated information as inaccessible, destroyed it before 
discovery began, and then pleaded that it did not know it was discoverable.  See 
Developments in the Law: Electronic Discovery, Electronic Discovery and Cost Shifting: 
Who Foots the Bill?, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1639, 1678 (2005) (stating that “[i]n this 
regard, the proposed amendments would legalize spoliation of electronic data”).  
However, the Advisory Committee never intended such a result.  Both Proposed Rule 
26(b)(2) and Proposed Rule 37(f) make it quite clear that preservation decisions are 
separated from the production process. 
55 The Sedona Principles, supra note 11.  Sedona Principle 5 provides that “[t]he 
obligation to preserve electronic data and documents requires reasonable and good faith 
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innovative approach is required, based on creative implementation of the 
“litigation hold” process and rooted in knowledge of the potential sources 
of discoverable information in use.56 
EARLY PRESERVATION DISCUSSIONS 
 
[14]  Traditionally, initial decisions about preservation obligations have 
been made unilaterally by the producing party with any challenges coming 
later, if at all, in the context of motions seeking sanctions.57  However, the 
paradigm of a producing party acting independently, and somewhat 
cavalierly, in determining its preservation obligations is modified by the 
Proposed Rules.58  Rule 26(f) will now require that parties meet “as soon 
as practicable” in order to “discuss any issues relating to preserving 
discoverable information.”59  The Rule 16(b) scheduling order will reflect 
the results of these discussions based on the discovery plan developed by 
the parties.  Revisions to Rule 16(b) and Revised Form 35 (“Report of 
Parties Planning Meeting”), Para. 3 (“Discovery Plan”) will effectuate this 
approach.60  
                                                                                                                         
efforts . . . [but] it is unreasonable to expect parties to take every conceivable step to 
preserve all potentially relevant data.”  Id. 
56 For an articulation of a litigation hold process by a member of the Advisory Committee 
during the time of the Proposed Rules, see Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 229 F.R.D. 
422 (S.D. N.Y. 2004) [hereinafter Zubulake V].  The suggestions of the Court are detailed 
with respect to the discussion of the respective roles of inside and outside counsel.  The 
principles to be employed are the same whether the threat is of litigation or governmental 
regulatory action.  See Cutler, Stegman & Helms, Document Preservation and 
Production in Connection with Securities and Exchange Commission Investigations and 
Enforcement Actions, 1517 PLI/Corp 579, 593 (2005). 
57 Motions for sanctions challenging the performance of preservation obligations are 
fairly routine when the loss of information is perceived to have impacted the ability to 
conduct a fair trial.  See, e.g., Coleman v. Morgan Stanley, No. CA 03-5045 AI, 2005 
WL 674885, at *10 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2005) (imposing a jury instruction to take allegations of 
complaint as proven due to failures to produce emails). 
58 See The Sedona Principles, supra note 11 (stating that “[r]esponding parties are best 
situated to evaluate the procedures, methodologies, and technologies appropriate for 
preserving and producing their own electronic data and documents”).  This principle is 
undoubtedly still true under the Proposed Rules, but the approach must now include 
making persuasive use of the information about those “procedures, methodologies and 
technologies” in discussions with opposing parties and court submissions.    
59 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-31. 
60 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-36. 
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[15]  The emphasis on early discussion of preservation issues is, in part, a 
response to the complaints about the unwelcome growth of an abusive 
sanctions practice aimed at the preservation context.61  The Advisory 
Committee considered and rejected promoting increased reliance on the 
use of preservation orders because of concern about potentially overbroad 
orders.62  Accordingly, the Committee Note discourages overuse of 
preservation orders by citing the cautionary language from the Manual for 
Complex Litigation, section 11.422, to the effect that “a blanket 
preservation order may be prohibitively expensive and unduly 
burdensome.”63  The Note also cautions that preservation orders issued 
“over objection should be narrowly tailored” and that “[e]x parte 
preservation orders should issue only in exceptional circumstances.”64   
 
[16]  Adjusting to the new paradigm of early discussion will require 
cooperation from both sides of the aisle.  Requesting parties must do a 
better job of articulating their focus – and do it early and often.  Producing 
parties must come to the table prepared to candidly discuss the steps they 
have taken to preserve any sources of potentially discoverable evidence 
that they believe may be implicated.  
 
OTHER TOPICS FOR EARLY DISCUSSION 
 
[17]  A pair of difficult issues for both producing and requesting parties 
has been the manner in which production is to be made and the way in 
which the inadvertent production of electronically stored information of 
privileged and trial preparation materials is to be handled.  Proposed Rule 
                                                 
61 The Advisory Committee heard substantial testimony to the effect that a preoccupation 
with sanction practice had replaced, in the judgment of some, a focus on the merits of the 
case.  Spoliation sanctions are very much on the mind of the trial bar.   See Robert L. 
Pottroff, Sanctions: Don’t Leave Home Without ‘Em, 1 Ann. 2003 ATLA-CLE 1017 
(2003) (stating that “no case should be litigated without at least investigating the 
possibility that evidence has been destroyed, hidden or tampered with by the opposing 
party”). 
62 See Treppel v. Biovail, No. 03 Civ. 3002, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4407, at *16 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2006) (explaining that full compliance with a preservation order can 
protect a producing party from sanctions if, absent such an order, otherwise discoverable 
information is lost because a party miscalculates its preservation obligations).   
63 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-34 (quoting MANUAL FOR 
COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.422 (2004). 
64 Id. at C-35. 
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26(f) will also require discussion of both of these topics, and Rules 16(b) 
and Form 35 will be changed to encourage and accommodate any 
agreements reached on either topic.  
 
[18]  Thus:  (a) Form of Production. One issue is whether and to what 
extent a party seeking production should be forced to specify a particular 
form or forms of production.  Under some state e-discovery provisions, 
the party requesting information must make a request, which can be 
contested.65  The Advisory Committee opted for a middle ground: a 
requesting party may, but need not, specify a preferred form or forms, but 
the responding party must either assent to the choice or indicate its 
intended form of production, which can be contested.  Production need be 
made in only one form, however.66 
 
[19]  The Proposed Rule also provides that, if the parties are unable to 
reach agreement or a court order is not entered, the information must be 
produced “either in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained, or 
in a form or forms that are reasonably usable.”67  If the information is 
maintained in a way that makes it “searchable by electronic means,” then 
“the information should not be produced in a form that removes or 
significantly degrades this feature.”68 
 
[20]  The “reasonably useable” alternative was substituted after the Public 
Hearings for a controversial option under which production could be in 
“an electronically searchable form.”69  Producing in a “reasonably 
useable” form may require that the producing party furnish technical 
assistance, information on application software, or other reasonable types 
of assistance.70 
                                                 
65 See TEX. R. CIV. PRO. 196.4 (1999). 
66 Proposed Rule 34(b) states: “[u]nless the parties otherwise agree, or the court otherwise 
orders: (iii) a party need not produce the same electronically stored information in more 
than one form.”  STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-73.  Some courts 
have held that a party may be entitled to both a hard copy and electronic versions of the 
same information.  See id.; McNally Tunneling Corp. v. City of Evanston, 2001 WL 
1568879, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2001). 
67 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-77. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at C-78. 
70 Id. at C-77. 
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[21]  Neither default form is intended to mandate production of metadata 
or embedded data.71  The Advisory Committee discussed the competing 
concerns at some length but ultimately decided that the best course of 
action was to remain silent and leave the issue to individual case law 
development.72  Metadata, for example, or information about information, 
varies in value or importance depending upon the matters at issue.73  It is 
rarely at issue in the majority of cases.  A requesting party may and should 
request a form of production that includes metadata if it believes it to be 
essential, and a producing party must either accede to the request or state 
an objection.  Ultimately, the matter is for the court to decide if the parties 
are unable to agree.74   
 
[21]  (b) Inadvertent Waiver by Production.  The parties must also 
discuss possible agreements to govern post-production claims of privilege 
or protection of trial preparation materials.  The Committee Note to Rule 
26(f) refers to “quick peek” agreements which allow a requesting party 
access to potentially privileged information without such access 
constituting a waiver.75  The requesting party can then make a narrower 
request, thus reducing the review burden on the parties and the courts.  
The Committee Note also mentions a “clawback agreement,” which 
allows parties to agree in advance that inadvertent production does not 
constitute a waiver of privilege or protection for trial preparation 
                                                 
71 But see Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 657 (D. Kan. 2005) 
(interpreting an order requiring production of Excel spreadsheet in form maintained to 
require production of associated metadata).  The presence of metadata – hidden 
information about the information portrayed – is one of the distinguishing features of 
electronic discovery.   
72 See Advisory Committee Minutes, April 2005, supra note 15, at 19.  Some Advisory 
Committee members cautioned that to “technically adept lawyers and experts,” the 
reference to production in a form in which it was “ordinarily maintained” included 
metadata and embedded data, while production in a “reasonably useable” form did not 
have that connotation.  Id. 
73 The Sedona Principles, supra note 11 (suggesting that a party should not be required to 
preserve or produce metadata absent a clear requirement based on an agreement or court 
order to do so).      
74 Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 652.  Magistrate Judge Waxse argues that emerging standards 
require a responding party faced with a request for production as an “active file” or for 
production in “native format” to affirmatively object to that request or be bound by it.  Id. 
at 652 n.69. 
75 See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-36. 
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materials.76  Absent such an agreement or court order, amended Rule 
26(b)(5)(B) will provide that the party making the claim of inadvertent 
production may notify the party receiving the information and trigger an 
obligation to “promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified 
information.”77  The Rule also requires the receiving party to neither use 
nor disclose the information until the claim is resolved.78  
 
[22]  Any attempt to deal with evidentiary privilege issues in the Federal 
Rules is potentially controversial in light of the statutory mandate that 
substantive changes receive affirmative approval by Congress.79  The 
Advisory Committee did not intend to deal with the substantive issue of 
privilege waiver through its proposals.80  Some commentators, however, 
expressed concern about the original proposals, for fear of the 
consequences in related to third party litigation.  One commentator 
opposing the rule stated that “[t]he language under consideration [in the 
initial proposal] does not account for these likely scenarios and might give 
unsuspecting attorneys a false sense of security.”81 
SANCTION LIMITATIONS (“SAFE HARBOR”) 
 
[23]  Proposed Rule 37(f) will limit rule-based sanctions for the failure to 
provide information in discovery when the loss results from a “routine, 
good-faith” operation.82  The Proposed Rule will not apply in “exceptional 
                                                 
76 Id.  The efficacy of this approach was the subject of much debate at the Public 
Hearings held in early 2005 and has been called into question by at least one court since 
then.  See Hopson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 232 F.R.D. 228, 231 (D. Md. 2005). 
77 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-57. 
78 Id. 
79 See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (2000) (any rule “creating, abolishing, or modifying an 
evidentiary privilege shall have no force or effect unless approved by an Act of 
Congress”). 
80 Currently, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules is considering proposed Rule 
502, which would set forth the scope of a waiver and extend the binding impact of a court 
approved selective waiver agreement to third parties in federal and state courts. 
81 See Noyes, supra note 25, at 648–649.  The Committee subsequently amended 
proposed Rule 16(b) so as to eliminate language which “might seem to promise greater 
protection than can be assured.”  STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-28. 
82 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-86 (stating that “[a]bsent 
exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party 
for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good 
faith operation of an electronic information system”). 
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circumstances” and it only explicitly limits sanctions whose authority rests 
on the Federal Rules.83  Limited and restricted though it may be,84 it 
nonetheless is a significant step towards bringing a sense of proportion 
and rationality to the debate over corporate and individual responsibility.85 
 
[24]  Early proposals for a “safe harbor” sought to address the issue by 
requiring a prior preservation order and limiting sanctions to only those 
losses which resulted from willful violations of the order.86  Selecting and 
preserving potentially discoverable electronically stored information for 
specific cases is very difficult in a business environment where disaster 
recovery tapes and active data are routinely overwritten or discarded for 
policy reasons unrelated to litigation.87  The problem is exacerbated by the 
presence of multiple litigations.  Information preserved for one case is 
theoretically available for other cases, compounding the volume and 
increasing the burden and complexity of searching for discoverable 
information.  It is virtually impossible to achieve perfect compliance, a 
                                                 
83 Id. 
84 The elements of judicial discretion present in revised Rule 37(f) have prompted some 
to question whether it is still reasonable to refer to it as a “safe harbor.”  See Kenneth J. 
Withers, We’ve Moved the Two Tiers and Filled in the Safe Harbor: Federal Rulemakers 
Respond to Public Comments on Electronic Discovery, FED. LAW., Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 54 
(noting that the phrase “safe harbor” is “no longer apt, if it ever was”). 
85 The final form of Rule 37(f) emerged at the April 2005 meeting of the Advisory 
Committee.  The compromise was adopted by a 9-2 vote and, with slight changes, is part 
of the Proposed Rules now before Congress.  Advisory Committee Minutes, April 2005, 
supra note 15, at 43. 
86 Thomas Y. Allman, The Case for a Preservation Safe Harbor in Requests for E-
Discovery, 70 DEF. COUN. J. 417, 423 (2003). 
No sanctions or other relief predicated upon a failure to preserve 
information shall be entered in the absence of an order that describes 
with particularity the specific information to be preserved and a finding 
that the party who failed to preserve such information acted willfully or 
willfully failed to act.  Evidence that reasonable steps were undertaken 
to notify custodians of the relevant information of the obligation to 
preserve the information shall be prima facie evidence of compliance 
with obligations under such preservation order. 
Id. 
87 See generally Eric Friedberg, To Recycle or Not to Recycle, That Is the Hot Backup 
Tape Question, 22 No. 12 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 16 (2005) (commenting on how 
the Zubulake V court’s suggested preservation obligations are not practical or realistic). 
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standard to which some cases point.88  Thus, special treatment for 
inadvertently lost electronically stored information makes sense from a 
public policy standpoint.  As Professor Martin Redish has noted, the loss 
of electronically stored information in a routine business context cannot 
fairly be said to support a presumption that the individual involved (or his 
or her employer) acted with an intent to spoliate.89  Proof of a heightened 
degree of culpability should be required.90 
 
[25]  The need for any safe harbor was hotly debated.  To some, the need 
seemed obvious in light of the mounting evidence that sanctions were 
being sought in instances where parties had attempted to take reasonable 
steps to meet their preservation obligations.91  Others saw in the reported 
decisions no evidence of a reason to act.  A study noted that most courts 
did not sanction for the “smallest infractions,” although they sometimes 
“sanction[ed] negligent but prejudicial conduct.”92  In response, 
                                                 
88 See Thomas Y. Allman, Ruling Offers Lessons for Counsel on Electronic Discovery 
Abuse, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Oct. 15, 2004, at 1, 2 (pointing out that Zubulake V 
appears to allow “no room for error, carelessness or preoccupation with other 
responsibilities” on the part of employees served with a litigation hold notice). 
89 Martin R. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L. J. 561, 
621 ( 2001) (noting that “[e]lectronic evidence destruction, if done routinely in the 
ordinary course of business, does not automatically give rise to an inference of 
knowledge of specific documents’ destruction, much less intent to destroy those 
documents for litigation-related reasons”); accord Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer 
Corp., 223 F.R.D. 162, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (stating that only in cases of intentional 
failure to preserve is it fair to presume that evidence would be harmful to the spoliator).   
90 One can draw an analogy to the policy requirement in the Private Securities Act, in 
which a safe harbor from liability can only be defeated by proof of actual knowledge of 
the false or misleading nature of a forward-looking statement subject to the rule.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 77z-2(c) (2000). 
91 “Reasonable steps do not always preserve everything.  Things slip through.  That is the 
point of the safe harbor.”  Advisory Committee Minutes, April 2005, supra note 15, at 18; 
see also Memorandum from Myles V. Lynk, Chair, Discovery Subcomm. & Richard 
Marcus, Special Reporter, Advisory Comm. on Civ. Rules to the Participants in February 
2004 Fordham E-Discovery Conference 34 (Jan. 27, 2004), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/E-Discovery_Conf_Agenda_Materials.pdf. 
92 Shira A. Scheindlin and Kanchana Wangkeo, Electronic Discovery Sanctions in the 
Twenty-First Century, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 71, 73, 94 (2004), 
http://www.mttlr.org/voleleven/scheindlin.pdf (reporting on the results of a review of 
forty-five federal cases and twenty-one state sanction cases). 
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proponents of a safe harbor argued that it was the fear of sanctions that 
produced an unfair chilling effect.93    
 
[26]  In the end, the Advisory Committee adopted a compromise limitation 
that applies only to losses from “routine, good faith” operations.  A 
“routine operation” is one that involves “the ways in which such systems 
are generally designed, programmed, and implemented to meet the party’s 
technical and business needs.”94  A broad range of business systems are 
included within the potential scope of the Rule.95  The distinguishing 
factor is whether the loss occurred in the context of a “good faith” 
operation of the system in question, taking into account any steps 
undertaken relating to the execution of preservation obligations.  This 
necessarily implicates the scope and rationality of the litigation hold 
process which has been followed in that case.96  The mere failure to 
prevent the loss of information does not bar protection from sanctions, 
since conduct is to be judged by a “good faith” standard intermediate 
between absolute perfection and willful misconduct.97   
                                                 
93 At the Public Hearings, proponents of the “safe harbor” strongly supported an 
alternative formulation for Rule 37(f) proposed by the Advisory Committee that would 
have required proof of willful or reckless conduct before sanctions could be imposed.   
The primary version of Rule 37(f) as then proposed would not have applied if the loss of 
the otherwise discoverable information had been due to negligence or failure to meet a 
court order.  See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, AUGUST 2004, supra note 5, at 32–33.  
The Advisory Committee resolved the debate by the compromise formulation discussed 
in the text. 
94 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-87. 
95 Id. at C-83. 
Examples . . . include programs that recycle storage media kept for brief periods 
against the possibility of a disaster that broadly affects computer operations; 
automatic overwriting of information that has been “deleted”; programs that 
change metadata (automatically created identifying information about the 
history or management of an electronic file) to reflect the latest access to 
particular electronically stored information; and programs that automatically 
discard information that has not been accessed within a defined period or that 
exists beyond a defined period without an affirmative effort to store it for a 
longer period.  
Id. 
96 See id. at C-85 (noting that “[t]he steps taken to implement an effective litigation hold 
bear on good faith, as does compliance with any agreements the parties have reached 
regarding preservation and with any court orders directing preservation”). 
97 See id. at C-84 (noting that “the Advisory Committee . . . revised Rule 37(f) to adopt a 
culpability standard intermediate between the two published versions.  The proposed rule 
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[27]  Rule 37(f), despite falling short of the full protection originally 
sought, nonetheless provides more certainty than may be available under 
existing case law.98  It is consistent with better reasoned decisions 
challenging losses due to the application of record retention programs.99  
The use of a “good faith” standard – with its connotations of reasonability 
and deference to common sense – is not unusual in the business or 
litigation context.100 
EXCEPTIONS 
 
[28]  Proposed Rule 37(f) contains a number of exceptions.  First, Rule 
37(f) on its face applies only to rule-based sanctions.  It does not purport 
to address situations where no prior order of discovery has issued and 
parties have resorted to the inherent powers of the trial courts.101  
However, federal courts may resist the temptation to invoke their inherent 
powers to reach contrary results from those which would apply under Rule 
37(f).  They may consider Rule 37(f) and its underlying polices to provide 
persuasive guidance for the resolution of disputes involving electronically 
                                                                                                                         
provides protection from sanctions only for the ‘good faith’ routine operation of an 
electronic system”). 
98 The effect of mere negligence in complying with preservation obligations is unsettled.  
Compare Se. Med. Supply v. Boyles, Moak & Brickell Ins., 822 So.2d 323, 329 (Miss. 
Ct. App. 2002) (ruling that destruction of computer files pursuant to a routine business 
procedure was not subject to sanctions where party had made duplicate copy), with 
DaimlerChrysler Motors v. Bill Davis Racing, No. Civ. A. 03-72265, 2005 WL 3502172, 
*2–3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 22, 2005) (containing a jury instruction indicating the 
appropriateness of sanctions while telling the jury to “presume, based upon the spoliation, 
that the evidence destroyed would have been favorable to plaintiff,” despite the fact that 
the “destruction of evidence in this case was negligent and not willful”). 
99 Courts addressing sanctions for loss of information in that context require proof of 
breach of a known preservation obligation by a party acting with a “culpable” state of 
mind and a resulting prejudice to the party or the trial.  See, e.g.,  Stevenson v. Union 
Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739, 747 (8th Cir. 2004) (requiring “some indication of an intent to 
destroy the evidence for the purpose of obstructing or suppressing the truth”). 
100 Compare the application of the business judgment rule to director conduct, whereby 
exculpation from personal liability for bad business decisions is available so long as the 
director acted in “good faith.”  Eric J. Friedman, Changing Currents for Directors’ 
Duties, 1467 PLI/Corp 11, 17–21 (2005). 
101 See MOSAID Techs. Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 333 (D.N.J. 
2004) (noting a failure to institute a litigation hold). 
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stored information in the absence of rule-based sanctions.102  One court 
has already done so.103  
 
[29]  Second, the protection of Rule 37(f) is inapplicable if “exceptional 
circumstances” are present.  This “safety valve” acknowledges that even a 
non-negligent loss of information can have highly prejudicial impact in 
some circumstances and render protection inappropriate.104  However, that 
does not mean that sanctions are automatic in such a case and a court 
would be guided by the existing precedent in that judicial circuit on the 
issue.  
 
[30]  Finally, as the Committee Note stresses, the limitations in Rule 37(f) 
are applicable only to “sanctions,” and not to “the kinds of adjustments 
frequently used in managing discovery if a party is unable to provide 
relevant responsive information.”105 
A NOTE ON CORPORATE RETENTION POLICIES 
 
[31]  The potential impact of the Proposed Rules on the evolution of 
corporate policy was a topic of much contention during the rule-making 
process.  Opponents of party-designated initial production argued that 
producing parties might “game” the process by simply making all 
                                                 
102 Such respect for Rule limitations in the face of inherent powers is not unknown.  For 
example, in the case of Brandt v. Vulcan, Inc., the Seventh Circuit refused to suggest that 
a court should have exercised its inherent powers to sanction discovery misconduct where 
the District Court had concluded that it lacked power to do so because of limitations 
under Rule 37(b)(2).  30 F.3d 752, 757 n.9 (7th Cir. 1994). 
103 See Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., where Magistrate Judge Francis relied 
upon an earlier version of proposed Rule 37(f) in absolving a party of the failure to 
undertake to preserve certain “ephemeral” information in the absence of a discovery 
order.  223 F.R.D. 162, 177 (S.D. N.Y. 2004), 
104 See STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-88 (stating that “this provision 
recognizes that in some circumstances a court should provide remedies to protect an 
entirely innocent party requesting discovery against serious prejudice arising from the 
loss of potentially important information”). 
105 Id.  The Advisory Committee was aware that “case management orders” are a 
necessary and frequent part of the administration of justice and clarified that point in the 
Committee Note to Rule 37(f), which states that “a court [can] order the responding party 
to produce an additional witness for deposition, respond to additional interrogatories, or 
make similar attempts to provide substitutes or alternatives for some or all of the lost 
information.” 
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electronic information difficult to access.106  A similar argument was 
levied against the “safe harbor” proposal on the ground that it would 
improperly encourage premature elimination of electronic information.   
 
[32]  Both arguments miss the mark widely.  Retention policies are 
typically adopted and implemented for business reasons, and no rational 
executive will or can long countenance deliberate attempts to make 
business information inaccessible for ordinary use.107  Underlying both 
arguments was the unstated assumption that some generalized public 
policy requires that all electronic information must be retained forever.108  
The Advisory Committee wisely rejected both arguments,109 especially in 
light of the potential civil and criminal ramifications of taking deliberate 
obstructing action in the face of litigation demands.110 
 
[33]  In fact, the Proposed Rules will have a positive influence by 
increasing the awareness of the need for effective corporate policies 
                                                 
106 A similar argument was made on policy grounds against cost shifting based on 
accessibility. The initial proposal provided only that “[a] party need not provide 
discovery of electronically stored information that the party identifies as not reasonably 
accessible.”  See ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, AUGUST 2004, supra note 5, at 26.  
Proposed Rule 26(b)(2)(B) now focuses on the sources of such information and adds 
“because of undue burden or cost” onto the end of the rule.  See STANDING COMMITTEE 
REPORT, supra note 2, at C-50. 
107 Effective compliance with legal and ethical obligations is a primary goal of corporate 
compliance policies.  The corporate guidelines in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
U.S.S.G § 8B2.1, were enhanced at the direction of Congress in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
Pub. L. No. 107-2004, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).  
108 See The Sedona Principles, supra note 11 (select “Publications” on the left side of the 
screen, then choose the appropriate link); cf. Arthur Andersen, L.L.P. v. United States, 
544 U.S. 696, 704-05 (2005) (stating that retention policies which lead to the destruction 
of information are common and appropriate in the absence of specific requirements of 
law). 
109 The concern that a party will deliberately “bury” information to avoid litigation 
demands is something of a red herring.  As the Standing Committee noted, “A party that 
makes information inaccessible [in a case] because it is likely to be discoverable in 
litigation is subject to sanctions now and would still be subject to sanctions under the 
proposed rule change.”  STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 2, at C-45.  
110 Congress has stiffened existing law and added new criminal penalties for one who 
knowingly alters or destroys documents with the intent to impede a federal investigation 
or proceeding or “in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 1519 (West Supp. 2005).  See Hill, supra note 53 (discussing impact of statute on 
destruction of information pursuant to records retention policies). 
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governing the use and retention of electronic information, especially 
email.  Policies have historically been fragmented and somewhat 
dysfunctional in this area.  Those sponsored by the information technology 
functions have often focused on the size of mailboxes as the primary 
management tool for email.111  On the other hand, records retention 
policies often rely on individual users to select email for retention based 
on content and office file plans.112  The interplay between the two 
necessarily involves difficult choices.  For example, a user might be 
required to apply retention categories with a set period of days or have it 
lost to automatic deletion.113  
 
[34]  The challenge is to integrate these competing and functional interests 
with litigation and compliance imperatives without impairing or degrading 
the efficient use of electronic systems.  In some cases, this can be as 
simple as reviewing and revising existing policies to make them more 
realistic and to enhance training to meet identified expectations especially 
in regard to implementing litigation holds.114  In other cases, however, it 
may involve consideration of technological solutions, such as some form 
of electronic archiving.115  Any solution adopted will involve a 
                                                 
111 See Randy Kahn, Electronic Communication Policies and Procedures, AIIM E-DOC 
MAGAZINE, June 24, 2005, http://www.aiim.org/article-docrep.asp?ID=30088. 
112 See U.S. Department of the Interior, It’s in the Mail: Common Questions about 
Electronic Mail and Official Records, 
http://www.doiu.nbc.gov/orientation/email.html#long (last accessed April 25, 2006).   
113 Courts sometimes express surprise with imperfect compliance by users with records 
retention.  See United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 21, 25 (D.D.C. 
2004) (noting that it was “astounding” that employees had failed to follow a “print and 
retain” requirement in a document retention policy).  However, such an occurrence is 
perfectly understandable and does not in and of itself indicate a failure to meet 
obligations imposed by law.  See Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 1997 WL 
33352759, at *6 (E.D. Ark. 1997) (allowing individual employees to use discretion 
whether to retain e-mail is not indicative of bad faith).    
114 An entity may, for example, wish to review email retention policies as a first step in a 
program to take a holistic look at electronic information management.  This will 
necessarily involve a focus on competing policy imperatives from among admittedly a 
wide range of options.  At a minimum, any solution should include an enhancement in 
compliance training of individual users to help them adhere to litigation hold policies. 
115 See Thomas Y. Allman, Email Retention: Time for a New Approach, AIIM E-Doc 
Magazine, Sept./Oct. 2005, http://www.edocmagazine.com/article_new.asp?ID=30580.  
Archiving can be implemented by configuration of existing software applications or by 
use of dedicated software and hardware designed for that purpose and either hosted or 
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compromise among  identified “pain points” based on competing budget 
constraints, issues of responsibility for implementation (“ownership”), and 
concerns over the risk of over-retention, with its own unique problems.116  
The Sedona Conference is hard at work attempting to articulate a rational 
framework and justification within which individual entities may select 
their comfort level in this and three other key areas.117 
CONCLUSION:  SOME MODEST SUGGESTIONS 
 
[35]  The Proposed Rules clearly require considerably more attention by 
in-house lawyers to early preparation for electronic discovery and place a 
premium on the execution of predictable and well-thought out plans.  
Based on my own experience, I can suggest three areas for improvement. 
FOCUS ON SOURCES AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS 
 
[36]  An on-going effort should be made, at least in regard to predictable 
types of litigation, to identify potential sources of discoverable 
information and to document and assess the burdens and costs associated 
with access and retrieval of electronic information from those sources.  
This effort will help to better facilitate the assessment of steps needed to 
prevent losses of information from those operations (and to justify those 
actions in the event they are not fully effective).  This approach can best 
be accomplished by investing the scarce time needed to develop good 
working relationships with appropriate IT personnel and to understand the 
actual operation of information applications.  This would also help 
identify potential testifying witnesses who can assist in briefing outside 
                                                                                                                         
made available by third parties.  The scope can be individual departments, classes of 
employees (such as executives) or entire portions of entities, with varying retention 
periods selected by policy.  Id. 
116 Archival and other technology solutions are often sold on an “ROI” basis which takes 
into account avoided costs of expensive storage as offset by the licensing, hardware and 
ongoing maintenance costs of the solution.  To the extent that additional volumes of 
information are retained, the calculations frequently overlook the added costs of access 
and review, especially for relevancy and privilege. 
117 The Sedona Conference WG1 Working Group on Electronic Document Production is 
currently in the process of developing Commentaries on four related topics: Email 
Management and Archiving, Legacy Data, Search and Retrieval and Litigation Holds.  
See The Sedona Principles, supra note 11. 
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counsel and appear, if needed, to explain the details to any reviewing 
court.  
LITIGATION HOLDS 
 
[37]  The scope and effectiveness of the litigation hold process, by 
whatever name it goes and whether it is formal or informal, should be 
enhanced by developing innovative approaches to cover both litigation 
and investigative possibilities.  At the heart of the process should be a 
sliding scale approach to assess and address whatever relevant sources of 
information may be understood to exist and to match them to the needs of 
the discovery process. 
OUTSIDE COUNSEL 
 
[38]  The division of effort among counsel in collecting, culling and 
producing information in litigation should be reevaluated with an eye to 
the emerging emphasis on sources of information.  Preparation for the 
“meet and confer” process should be enhanced so that outside counsel are 
better prepared to accurately discharge their ethical and legal obligations 
to both their clients and the court.  Candid “after action” assessments of 
earlier preservation and production experience should be routine and 
meetings should be held with outside counsel and consultants to discuss 
mutual expectations in order to ensure that the interests of all parties are 
aligned. 
*    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    *    * 
 
[39]  The Proposed Rules constitute a remarkable achievement which 
should help establish uniform practices for those unfamiliar with the 
unique issues involved in e-discovery.   When coupled with the 
suggestions outlined above – and others like them – parties will be better 
prepared to participate in the good faith and reasonable approach to e-
discovery which will be essential to their success. 
